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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, s 
vs. : 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON : 
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO s 
CROOKSTON HACKING, J 
Defendant/Appellant. s 
: Case No. 940190-CA 
t Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING 
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1992). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's order overruling 
and denying appellant's ("Hacking") objection to the recommendation 
of the domestic relations commissioner. The commissioner ruled 
that the custody of the parties' three minor children should be 
changed from Hacking to appellee ("Crookston"); that Hacking should 
pay child support based on an imputed minimum wage; and that 
Hacking should also pay Crookston's attorney fees. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in changing the custody of the 
three minor children from Hacking to Crookston solely on the basis 
of the allegations in the petition and Hacking's failure to timely 
file an answer, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing on 
whether a substantial change in circumstances existed and whether 
it would be in the best interest of the children to change custody. 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to make any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law as to the steps taken in reaching the 
decision to change the custody of the minor children from Hacking 
to Crookston. 
3. Did the trial court err in imputing a minimum wage to 
Hacking, for child support purposes, without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing on her earnings. 
4. Did the trial court err in awarding Crookston attorney 
fees without taking any evidence on the financial situation of the 
parties and the reasonableness of the fee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The questions before the court raise the issue whether the 
trial court, which has broad discretion in child custody matters, 
abused its discretion in changing the custody of three minor 
children and awarding child support and attorney fees. Sukin v. 
Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1922); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 
193 (Utah App. 1992) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Crookston filed a petition with the district court to change 
the custody of the parties' three minor children from Hacking to 
himself. An answer was not timely filed and a default certificate 
was entered. Hacking moved the court to set aside the default 
certificate while Crookston moved the court to grant a default 
judgment. The commissioner granted the motion for a default 
judgment and that decision was upheld by the district court judge. 
The order transferred the custody of three minor children from 
Hacking to Crookston; awarded Crookston child support by imputing 
to Hacking the ability to earn a minimum wage; and awarded 
Crookston his attorney fees. The default judgment was granted 
without any evidence being taken on whether there had been a 
substantial change in circumstance justifying a change of custody, 
and if it would be in the best interest of the minor children to 
change their custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In this action the essential facts are: 
1. Crookston filed a petition to modify the decree of 
divorce on about May 4, 1992. The petition alleges that the 
custody of the parties' three minor children should be changed to 
Crookston because the children were living in an unstable 
environment, under poor living conditions, and because Hacking had 
interfered with Crookston's right to visit the children by not 
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keeping Crookston informed of their whereabouts. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 160-65 and Addendum A.) 
2. Hacking failed to timely file and answer to the petition. 
(Record on Appeal, p. 167.) 
3. A default certificate was filed by Crookston on November 
17, 1992. (Record on Appeal, p. 171 and Addendum A.) 
4. A motion for default judgment was filed by Crookston on 
January 20, 1993. (Record on Appeal, pp. 178-80.) 
5. Hacking filed an answer to the petition on February 18, 
1993. The answer was filed prior to any default judgment being 
entered, but it was also filed without permission of the court. 
(Record on Appeal, pp. 187-88.) Hacking also filed a motion to set 
aside the default judgment. (Record on Appeal, p. 181 and Addendum 
A«) These documents were filed in behalf of Hacking by Richard S. 
Clark, II, ("Clark") an attorney from Provo. 
6. Counsel for Crookston stated, in one of his affidavits, 
that he had waited a significant period before filing the default 
certificate because of representations made by Clark that an answer 
was forthcoming. (Record on Appeal, pp. 173-77.) Clark, in his 
affidavit, stated that it took some time to file an answer due, in 
part, to problems in keeping in contact with Hacking. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 185-86.) 
7. Crookston filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion 
to set aside the default judgment on March 15, 1993. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 207-14.) In a further affidavit, counsel for Crookston 
detailed the problems he faced in getting Clark to take any action. 
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(Record on Appeal, pp. 192-97.) 
8. In February, 1993, shortly after Clark filed an answer 
and other documents in behalf of Hacking, he was suspended from the 
practice of law. Clark apparently did not immediately notify 
Hacking or the court of that development. 
9. The motions filed by both Crookston and Hacking were 
initially set for hearing in July, 1993, but the hearing was 
continued because it had been learned that Clark was suspended. 
(Record on Appeal, pp. 216-17.) Clark did not officially withdraw 
from the case until faxing a notice of withdrawal to the court on 
August 5, 1993. (Record on Appeal, p. 219.) 
10. It appears that Clark did not inform Hacking, who was 
living in Oregon, of the events taking place in the case. Hacking 
maintains that she knew little about what was happening until 
receiving a notice of a hearing for November 18, 1993. It was 
only after that notice was received that Hacking discovered that 
Clark had been suspended and was no longer representing her. 
(Record on Appeal, pp. 239-41.) 
11. The notice of hearing indicated that the pending motions 
previously scheduled for July 1993, were to be heard on November 
18, 1993. (Record on Appeal, pp. 229-30.) 
12. Hacking obtained the assistance of Utah Legal Services to 
represent her just prior to the November hearing. (Record on 
Appeal, p. 231.) 
13. The hearing was set before the commissioner who ruled in 
favor of Crookston. The commissioner denied the motion to set 
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aside the default certificate and granted Crookston the relief 
prayed for in the motion for default judgment. (Record on Appeal, 
pp. 244-48, and November 18f 1993 Transcript, pp. 333-342 and 
Addendum B.) The effect of the order was to change the custody of 
the three minor children from Hacking to Crookston, and to grant 
Crookston child support and attorney fees, without any evidentiary 
hearing. 
14. On November 26, 1993 Crookston filed an objection to the 
recommendation of commissioner. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-52.) 
The objection was heard by the district court judge on February 22, 
1994. The district court judge overruled and denied Hacking's 
objection* (Record on Appeal, pp. 262-63 and Addendum B.) Hacking 
has now appealed that order. (Record on Appeal, pp. 288-89.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in changing the custody of the three 
minor children from Hacking to Crookston; in assessing Hacking a 
child support obligation based on minimum wage; and in assessing 
attorney fees, simply on the basis of the allegations raised in the 
petition and Hacking's failure to timely file an answer. The court 
should have set aside the default judgment; taken evidence on 
whether there had been a substantial change in circumstance 
justifying a change of custody; determine if it would be in the 
best interest of the minor children to change custody; and issued 
findings of fact and conclusion of law in support of the decision 
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reached. 
ARGUMENT 
Hacking takes the position that in determining whether to 
change custody of minor children from one party to another, the 
trial court must do the following: 
1. Determine if there has been a substantial change of 
circumstance justifying a change of custody, 
2. Determine if it would be in the best interest of the 
minor children to make a change. 
3. If it determines that both conditions have been met, 
issue specific findings of fact and conclusions of law along with 
the order changing custody so that one may determine the basis on 
which the court reached its conclusions. 
In Soltanieh v. King, 826 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 1992) the 
Utah Court of Appeal stated: 
Before modifying a custody or visitation 
order, a trial court must find there has been 
a material change in the circumstances upon 
which the earlier order was based, and a 
change in custody is in the best interests of 
the child. Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 
611 (Utah 1984); Hogge v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d 51, 
54 (Utah 1982). Where an original custody 
determination involved a thorough examination 
into the best interests of the child, a court 
should rigidly apply the two-step change in 
circumstances test in Hogge. Hardy v. Hardy, 
776 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah App. 1989). However, 
when the custody award is premised on a 
default decree, the trial court has not made a 
thorough examination of the child's best 
interests. Therefore, the trial court may 
receive evidence as to the best interests of 
the child when determining whether to reopen 
the custody issue. See Cummings v. Cummings, 
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821 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah App. 1991). However, 
when the trial court does not apply the two-
step process, "it still must conduct a 
separate analysis and make separate findings 
as to substantial change in circumstances." 
Id. 
Further, in Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah App. 
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out the importance of 
issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law in saying: 
Trial courts are given broad discretion in 
making child custody awards. Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's decision regarding custody 
will not be upset "absent a showing of an 
abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." 
Id. at 159. "However, to ensure the court 
acted within its broad discretion, the facts 
and reasons for the court's decision must be 
set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions." Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 
907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). The findings must 
be sufficiently detailed "to ensure that the 
trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based." Martinez v. Martinez, 728 
P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986). "Specificity of 
findings is particularly important in custody 
determinations. This is so because the issues 
involved are highly fact sensitive." Roberts 
v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
In this case the court changed the custody of the children 
solely on the basis of the allegations raised in Crookston's 
petition and Hacking's failure to timely answer it. The court took 
no evidence on whether there had been a substantial change of 
circumstance or if it would be in the best interest of the minor 
children to have their custody changed from one parent to another. 
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were issued. 
It is submitted that there are few decisions more important 
than determining the custody of minor children, and that the court 
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should have set aside the default certificate, taken evidence on 
the issues, made a decision, and issued its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of its order. The most important 
consideration is the best interest of the children, not whether a 
pleading has been timely filed. (See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 
(1989.) 
There is no question that the allegations raised by Crookston 
in his petition are serious, but they are only allegations. Also 
important is the old legal maxim that one cannot fry a pancake so 
thin that it does not have two sides. Hacking was never given the 
opportunity to present her side of the story. 
This case was in limbo for a long time and Hacking and her 
former counsel may have contributed to that delay. Nonetheless, 
Crookston had the opportunity to set the matter for trial after 
Hacking filed an answer after the default certificate had been 
filed, but before the default judgment had been granted. It is 
highly unlikely that the trial court would have denied a request 
for trial setting though the answer was filed without first 
obtaining permission from the court. Instead, Crookston chose to 
pursue a default judgment for the next nine months. Taking that 
approach prevented any evidence from being presented on the best 
interest of the children. 
The court not only determined that custody should be changed 
from Hacking to Crookston, but also that Hacking should begin 
paying child support on the basis that she was capable of earning 
a minimum wage. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1992), provides 
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that: 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or 
a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed• 
In this case Hacking has never stipulated to an imputed income and 
no hearing has ever been held to determine if income should be 
imputed to her. The court simply imputed a minimum wage to Hacking 
on the basis of the allegations in the petition and her failure to 
timely file an answer. 
The court also awarded Crookston attorney fees on the basis of 
the allegations in the petition and Hacking's failure to timely 
file an answer. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) allows for the 
court to award attorney fees in child custody cases. The problem 
again is that the award was made without the benefit of an 
evidentiary hearing. If the court had allowed evidence to be taken 
on the custody issue, it would have been in a position to evaluate 
the child support and attorney fees allegations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted 
that the decision of the trial court to grant Crookston a default 
judgment against Hacking solely based on the allegations in the 
petition and her failure to timely file an answer was an abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed• The default judgment should be 
set aside and the trial court instructed to take evidence on 
whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances 
justifying a change of custody and whether it would be in the best 
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interest of the children to make a change. The Court should also 
determine what, if any, child support and attorney fees should be 
awarded. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of 
1994, I delivered two true and correct copy of? the ©RIEF OF 
APPELLANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING; to Willard Bishop, 
Attorney for Appellee, 36 North 300 West, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, 
Utah 84721-0279. 
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ADDENDUM A 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0« Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IK THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, who represents and petitions the Court as 
follows: 
1. On or about September 13, 1990, the above-entitled Court 
executed its Decree of Divorce in this action, 
2o Among other things, the Decree of Divorce awarded 
Defendant the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor 
children, being Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea Christine 
Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, Plaintiff was awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation, specified in detail in the Decree 
of Divorce. 
3, The award of custody and visitation was accomplished by 
agreement, pursuant to a certain "Stipulation for Settlement". The 
custody and visitation questions in the case were not litigated* 
4. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, circumstances 
with respect to the custody, visitation, and support of the 
children have changed substantially, as follows: 
IfeD 
A. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's rights of 
visitation with the children, by falsely informing Plaintiff 
of where she and the children were living, and thereafter, by 
leaving the State of Utah and not providing Plaintiff with the 
address of the children. 
B. Defendant has wrongfully subjected the parties' 
minor children to numerous residents and school changes, as 
follows: 
(1) At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Defendant and the children were living with Defendant's 
mother in Provo, Utah. The children were attending 
Joaquin School in Provo. 
(2) On or about October 31, 1990, Defendant 
absconded from the State of Utah, taking the children 
with her, and moved to Tacoma where she resided with one 
Scott Hacking, to whom she was not married. The 
children, of course, were required to change schools 
also. 
(3) In or about the month of February of 1991, 
Defendant moved to Coos' Bay, Oregon, where she lived 
with either her mother or her grandmother. The children, 
of course, were once again required to change schools. 
(4) In or about the month of March of 1991, 
Plaintiff returned to Provo to yet another residence, 
enrolling the children once again in the Joaquin School. 
2 
\(o\ 
At this time, she lived with a friend by the name of 
"Cindy". 
(5) In or about May of 1991, Defendant moved to yet 
another residence in Provo where she resided once again 
with Scott Hacking. This move required that the children 
be enrolled in Timpanogos Elementary School. 
(6) At or about Thanksgiving in November of 1991, 
Defendant moved to 2537 South Lakecrest, #2 (1810 West), 
West Valley City, Utah 84120, where she lived once again 
with Scott Hacking. The children were required to change 
to the Redwood Elementary School. 
(7) In or about early March of 1992, Defendant 
indicated her desire to move back to Coos1 Bay, Oregon, 
which would require yet another change of residence and 
schools for the children. 
(8) On or about March 16, 1992, Defendant absconded 
from the State of Utah, leaving no forwarding address and 
taking the children with her. 
C. Prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Defendant's housekeeping habits were acceptable. Since then, 
however, those habits have deteriorated to the point that the 
children are not kept clean and their clothing and environment 
emit bad odors. 
D. On or about March 4, 1992, Plaintiff remarried. He 
now resides in a home purchased by him at 8845 South 630 East, 
Sandy, Utah 84070, and can provide the children with a living 
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environment superior to that of Defendant, and can provide the 
children with a stable, two-parent home, where they will not 
be required to make constant moves and constant changes of 
school. 
5. The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in 
the best interest of the parties' minor children. 
6. Although it was anticipated at the time the Decree of 
Divorce was entered that Defendant would obtain employment, she has 
remained unemployed. Insofar as Plaintiff knows, Defendant 
receives aid from AFDC. Scott Hacking, with whom she is living 
without benefit of clergy, receives some form of disability 
payments. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows 2 
1. That the Decree of Divorce in this matter be modified as 
follows: 
A. To change custody of the parties' minor children 
from Defendant to Plaintiff, subject to rights of reasonable 
visitation in Defendant. 
B. To provide for child support to be paid by Defendant 
to Plaintiff, in accordance with the applicable guidelines. 
2. That Plaintiff be awarded his attorney fees, costs of 
court, and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
3. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED this dav of March, 1992. 
MICHAEL EUGEtfE CROOKSTON 
4 
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OPT 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON: 
In this action, Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON having been 
regularly served with process, and having failed to appear and answer Plaintiffs "Petition 
to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file herein, and the time allowed by law for answering 
having expired, the default of said REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, in the 
premises is hereby duly entered according to law. 
WITNESS THE CLERK OF SAID COURT, with the seal thereof attached, this 
/ 7 $ 7 day of November, 1992. 
RJTCHARD S. CLARK I r . 
Attorney at Law 
18Q6 North Oakridge Lano 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 377-3820 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
REBECCA ANN BAT10 CROOKSTON 
Defendant. 
) 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 8845Q2229DA 
) 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through her attorney Richard S. 
Clark II. and motions the court to set aside the default judgment 
pursuant to rule 60 (b) for the reasons set forth in the 
memorandum and affidavit of counsel attached hereto. 
DATED this /^ day of ^ U i ^ , 1993. 
'RICHARD' s. CLARK II 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document to Willard R. Bishop at P.O. 
Box 279 Cedar City, Utah 84721-Q279. 
2£_ 
I K\ 
ADDENDUM B 
2 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH; THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1 8 , 199 3 
- o O o -
THE COURT: 884502229, Michael Eugene Crookston 
versus Rebecca Ann Batio. 
Mr. Julien? 
MR. BISHOP: I haven't seen him this morning, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We're having tremendous trouble 
getting this matter resolved, aren't we? 
MR. BISHOP: I followed the Court's 
instructions. I'm here, and I wish to proceed. 
THE COURT: He has filed a motion for 
continuance. 
Were you given a copy of that? 
MR. BISHOP: I got a copy, yes. And I strongly 
object to it. 
THE COURT: I do too. Absent some indication in 
writing from a trained medical person indicating that she 
can't travel, I — I don't see any reason to perpetuate 
this nonsense. 
MR. BISHOP: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Julien, I have your motion to 
continue, and I was just advising counsel this has just 
been what appears to me a delaying action on the part of 
DATTT /^  
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the defendant. 
MR. JULIEN: Well, my motion for continuance was 
only a — sort of a lukewarm motion. I only said that I 
was unprepared to respond to allegations in the — 
THE COURT: You know, something in — in writing 
from a trained medical person saying she can't travel might 
have bent the Court a little bit. But just her saying, 
"I'm too sick to travel" is not going to cut it. 
MR. JULIEN: All right. 
MR. BISHOP: Fine. I'd like to move forward if 
I can, then, Your Honor. 
There are presently — 
THE COURT: Can I just sign this? Will that 
solve it? 
MR. BISHOP: Sure. You bet. 
THE COURT: This is an order overruling and 
denying the motion to set aside default judgment. 
MR. JULIEN: Okay. I don't get to say —• say my 
position in this case? 
THE COURT: Yeah. You can tell me your 
position. 
MR. JULIEN: All right. I'd like to for the 
record. 
THE COURT: I haven't signed it yet. I just 
asked if that would decide the problem of addressing each 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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of these issues that have already been addressed. 
MR. BISHOP: Yes, it would. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JULIEN: Okay. I have filed a supplemental 
memorandum — I suppose the Court has that — outlining the 
background as I see it in my brief appearance in this 
case. 
The way it looks to me is that you have a 
petition to modify the decree of divorce filed by 
Plaintiff. I have it on May 4th, 1992. Then you have 
service upon Miss Crookston shortly thereafter. 
Mrs. Crookston does not timely file an Answer, 
and so a default certificate was filed November 17th, 1992, 
by Mr. Bishop, and then you have Mr. Bishop filing a motion 
for default judgment on January 20th, 1993. And then you 
have after that an Answer filed by Mrs. Crookston on 
February 18th, 1993, by her attorney, Mr. Clark, and then 
you also have a -— a motion to set aside the default 
judgment filed on that same day. 
So the way I look at it is as of February 20th, 
199 3, you've got the petition, you've got the Answer and no 
default judgment. So it would seem to me at that point in 
time, you would think, "Okay. Here's the petition; here's 
the Answer. No default judgment. Let's go ahead with the 
trial." 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JULIEN: But Mr. Bishop or his — probably 
at the insistence of his counsel — or of his client, files 
a memorandum in opposition to setting aside the default 
judgment. I/m sorry. A memorandum opposed to the motion 
to set aside the default judgment. And that thing has been 
pursued now for nine months. 
And so it appears to me that what's happened 
here, we have the plaintiff doing everything he can to try 
and get custody of the minor children changed from 
Mrs. Crookston to him on the basis of a default 
certificate. Had there simply been a motion to proceed to 
trial, this case may have been over by now. 
And — and the concern I have is we are talking 
here about the custody of children. Of what greater issue 
can there be than that? And where7s the logic in changing 
custody from one person to another on the basis of 
allegations simply raised in a petition? 
THE COURT: I agree with you, Mr. Julien, but we 
can't get your client into a court of law. And we haven't 
been able to for two years. 
MR. JULIEN: Okay. I can't respond to that, 
because I wasn't present. 
THE COURT: No. Obviously she doesn't value the 
custody of her children as much as you do, because all 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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she's done is stall. 
I agree that this issue should be tried on the 
merits to see what is in the best interests of the 
children. But if she won't come to court, we can't do it. 
And if she doesn't come to court, we could have a trial, 
and they'd win anyway. 
MR. JULIEN: But there's never been — been an 
actual trial setting that I'm aware of. of course I'm not 
aware of much in this case. 
THE COURT: The - the technical difficulty I 
have, Mr. Bishop, is that - is that judgment has never 
been entered. 
MR. BISHOP: That's right. That's true. 
THE COURT: so how could we set aside something 
that's never been entered? 
MR. BISHOP: That's right. That's their motion 
to set aside the default judgment. 
Probably, as Mr. Julien has pointed out, what 
Mr. Clark should have done, as he indicated to me he would 
do on the telephone and never did do, was to file a motion 
to set aside the default. That was never done. 
I'd like to take a few minutes if I could to lay 
out some background. And Mr. Julien hasn't been in this 
case from day one, and so he doesn't know a lot of — 
THE COURT: We have, haven't we? 
PAUL G. MCMULLTN 
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MR. BISHOP: Yes, we have. 
Back in 1988, Mrs. Crookston took the kids and 
ran. Disappeared. She didn't tell Mr. Crookston where she 
was going. At that time, a Complaint was filed. There was 
an Order to Show Cause issued. We were here, and we had a 
hearing on the 21st of December of 1988 on the issue of 
visitation. Mrs. Crookston came in, and she made some 
rather serious allegations of physical abuse of the 
children. And we had a very extended hearing with detailed 
evidence, and as a result, the Court made some very 
specific findings. 
In fact, that never occurred. What she was 
trying to do was she was trying to take normal family 
difficulties and claim that they resulted in physical 
abuse. And as a result of that, Mr. Crookston was — did 
get some visitation. 
Then at that time, Utah Legal Services was 
involved, but it was Susan White that was representing 
Mrso Crookston at that time. 
The matter proceeded with some interrogatories, 
and then the parties tried to reconcile. They moved back 
in together, and they were in together until, oh, I guess 
early 1990. There was another separation, and at that 
time, the matter did proceed to a divorce, and there was 
some visitation awarded. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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Now, the decree of divorce was entered in 
September of 1990. Within a month of the entry of the 
decree of divorce, Mrs. Crookston took the kids and ran 
again. Disappeared. Left no notice as to where she was 
going. No address where — where he would be able to 
contact the kids. The record shows that at or about the 
time of the divorce, that she was making statements to 
Mr. Crookston "I and the children should" — "would be 
better off if we could go and start a new life all without 
any contact from you." And that's what she tried to do. 
She tried to take off and cut off all contact of 
Mr. Crookston with the children. 
There was a petition to modify filed in early 
1991, because of the fact that she was interfering with the 
visitation rights by running and not letting him know 
where —• where she was with the children. We couldn't find 
her address. We had to come to court. We had to get the 
Court to authorize us to issue a subpoena duces tecum to 
the Offices of Family Services so we could obtain an 
address and make contact. And at that point, after we made 
contact, believe it or not, she moved back from Washington 
where she had disappeared and moved back to Provo. And 
that petition was at that point rather dropped, because 
they were able then to have contact and have visitation. 
Well, things looked to be all right until she 
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disappeared again. This time in 1992. Didn't leave any 
address. Mr. Crookston was able to track her down through 
a search that he made, and we filed the second petition. 
But what we have is a continual effort on her 
part to avoid the Court's order; to avoid visitation; to do 
whatever she can to terminate the relationship between that 
father and his children. 
Now, she was served personally with this 
petition* If you'll look, there have been no less than 
five different times since this petition was filed that she 
was given notice in writing or her attorney was given 
notice in writing to get an Answer filed, or if not, her 
default would be entered. It never happened. 
Now, the talk about the — that an Answer has 
now been filed is not correct. There's an Answer in the 
file, but it can't have been filed, because the default was 
entered first. In order to file an Answer, now she has to 
obtain permission of the Court. That has never been done. 
Given these circumstances — 
THE COURT: Then there's the question of the 
validity of the Answer because of the status of her 
attorney? 
MR. BISHOP: Yes. 
MR. JULIEN: I — I did some checking on that* 
Mr, Clark was apparently suspended in February of '93„ The 
F l A T T T *~\ H j r « 1 l / r T T T T TT-K 1 
10 
Answer was filed in February of '93. I'm — I'm assuming 
that he filed the Answer just prior to, but I don't know. 
MR. BISHOP: So that's the situation. We think 
that under the circumstances of this case, that we are 
entitled to judgment. 
MR. JULIEN: I just have one other — one other 
comment, and then I'm done. I — I agree. If — if 
everything Mr. Bishop says is true, we certainly have a 
substantial change in circumstance. But can you say for 
certain that it's still in the best interest of the 
children to transport ~ for them — from the plaintiff to 
the '— from the defendant — from the plaintiff to the 
defendant or from the defendant to the plaintiff — what am 
I? The defendant or the plaintiff? 
THE COURT: A default is a default. 
MR. BISHOP: You're the defendant. 
MR. JULIEN: Okay. Sorry. 
THE COURT: A default is a default. 
MR. JULIEN: Well, you've got a default 
certificate. If that's all you need, why do you have to 
file a default judgment? 
THE COURT: We need to change this order, 
Mr. Bishop, to say motion to set aside default, not default 
judgment. And then — 
MR. BISHOP: Okay. I used that because that was 
11 
the term of his motion. 
THE COURT: And then you may file your judgment, 
MR. BISHOP: Thank you. I'll do that. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. You have your 
judgment attached. 
MR. BISHOP: Yes. I provided one. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BISHOP: All right. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JULIEN: Now, is that the one we're going to 
be •— are you — you're signing — are you signing —• just 
in case there were any appeal taken, is there, then, a 
judgment being signed by the Court today? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JULIEN: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded.) 
Hil. -;-u ! ll 1 Yi 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Wiilard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801)586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
Civil No. 884502229DA 
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema 
This matter having come before the Court on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's 
"Notice of Hearing"., and Plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record, 
Mr. Wiilard R. Bishop, and Defendant not having appeared personally, but the 
Commissioner having been contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, 
II, during which contact counsel for Defendant informed the Court that he could not 
represent Defendant and would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel", and 
the Court having continued a!! pending motions based upon the representation that such 
a notice of withdrawal would be filed, and no such notice of withdrawal having been 
COPY 
filed, and good cause appearing, the Court having considered the files and records of 
the case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's "Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment" should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied. 
RECOMMENDED this /# day of A&£aSt,"1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
C(H> ?>^-r MARLYNNJS LEMA Domestio-'Kelations Commissioner 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 884502229DA 
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, ) Honorable Marlynn B. Lema 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Motion for 
Default Judgment", brought up by Plaintiff's "Notice of Hearing". Plaintiff MICHAEL 
EUGENE CROOKSTON did not appear personally, but was represented by his attorney 
of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON 
did not appear personally, and was not represented by counsel. The Court had been 
contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, who indicated that he could 
not represent Defendant and, as a result, would forthwith file a "Notice of Wthdrawal of 
Counsel". Over the objections of Plaintiff's attorney, the Court continued hearing in 
3-'s 
connection with Plaintiff's "Motion for Default". The matter now having been brought 
back before the Court by Willard R. Bishop, Plaintiff's counsel, and it appearing that 
despite the representations of Richard S. Clark, II, that he would file a notice of 
withdrawal of counsel, no such notice of withdrawal has been filed, and good cause 
appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That default judgment should be and hereby is, entered in favor of Plaintiff 
Michael Eugene Crookston and against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, in 
connection with Plaintiff's "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file in this 
action. 
2. That the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea 
Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children, should 
be and it hereby is, awarded to Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston, subject to rights of 
reasonable visitation in Defendant. 
3. That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and she hereby 
is, required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with the applicable 
guidelines, based upon Plaintiff's current gross income of $2,464.76 per month, and 
imputed income to Defendant at the minimal wage rate of $4.25 per hour, 40 hours per 
week, 4.3 weeks per month, for an imputed wage of Defendant in the amount of $731.00 
2 
^ " 7 
per month. Upon presentation of a completed, "Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
(Sole Custody)", using three children and the wages stated, Plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have the Court execute an "Order of Child Support" in the appropriate amount. 
4. That Plaintiff should be and he hereby is, awarded judgment for his 
reasonable attorney fees and costs of Court, $361.98 attorney fees as shown by the 
Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98; together with 
interest upon the declining balance of said judgment at the judgment rate of 5.72% per 
annum, from and after the execution of this document until paid in full. 
RECOMMENDED this / f ^ d a v of XuguJTl993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Domestic Relat i%i^<^^ff^Oner 
U / 
W1LLARD R. BiSHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-C279 
Telephone: (801)566-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON ) 
i ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING 
Plaintiff. ) OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION 
) OF COMMISSIONER 
vs. ) 
) 
REBECCA ANN BATiO CROCKSTON. ) Civil No 894502229DA 
) Honorable James L Shumate 
Defendant. ) 
) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on 
Tuesday, Februan/ 22 1994, pursuant to Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston's 
"Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner' Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio 
Crookston did not appear personally, but was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. 
Stephen W. Julien, Esq of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston 
appeared personally and vvas represented by his attorney cf record, Mr. Willard R. 
Bishop. Argument was had. The Court having reviewed the files and records of the 
case, having heard cral argument and having determined that the files arc records of 
the case show the consistent color of tne efforts of Defendant to frustrate Plaintiff's 
€tWY^ 
parental rights insofar as the children of the parties are concerned, and having 
determined that the decision of the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, insofar as it pertains to the "Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Default" and the "Default Judgment" entered in this matter on November 18,1993, 
is correct in all respects, from both procedural and substantive standpoints, and good 
cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows; 
1. That the "Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" filed by 
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and it hereby is, overruled and 
denied. 
2. That the "Order and Overruling Denying Motion to Set Aside Default" and 
the "Default Judgment" executed by the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, November 18, 1993, and entered on the same date, should be and 
hereby are, adopted as the order and decision of the Court; provided, however, that 
2 
pursuant to Rule 6-401(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, said decisions have 
been the order of the Court from the time of their entry, not having been modified. 
o M*tr 
DATED this / day of-Febftrary, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STEPHEN W. JUUEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
/ 
JAMES'L SHUMATE, District Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
30-3-1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-3-1- Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
rreconcilable differences, 
unsdiction, district courts 
rreconcilable differences. 
Because Subsection (3)(h) does not set forth a 
pecific fault of the defendant, in contrast to 
ie other subsections, it can be inferred that 
ubsection (3)(h), unlike the other provisions, 
intended to be a no-fault provision There-
fore, no fault need be proven to apply Subsec-
tion (3)(h) Haumont v Haumont, 793 P 2d 421 
(Utah Ct App 1990) 
Jurisdiction, district courts. 
When purported marriage is void ab initio 
under *? 30-1-2, a trial court lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree Van 
Der Stappen v Van Der Stappen 815 P 2d 
1335 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — No-Fault 
vorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 
Y U L Rev 79 
A.L.R. — Insanity as defense to divorce or 
Daration suit — post-1950 cases, 67 
L R 4th 277 
Divorce and separation effect of court order 
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on 
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance 
policy, 68 A L R 4th 929 
)-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
ablish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
>perty in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
orney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
*ty to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
y include provision for costs of the action. 
2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
nony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
I attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
n the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
ited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or 
srs in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
I) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
ride money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the 
T party. 
) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
ment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
idgment. 
tory: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. 
ch. 137, * 1. 
>eals and Reenactments. — Laws 1993, 
I, i? 10 repeals former * 30-3-3, Utah 
\nnotated 1953, allowing a court to order 
either party to pay for the separate support 
and maintenance of the adverse party and the 
children, and enacts the present section, effec-
tive Mav 3, 1993 
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30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions if both the parties who have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered and have completed 
attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except 
if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of 
one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and com-
pletion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of 
the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may specifically desig-
nate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for sufficient 
cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, 
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from the signing and entry of 
the decree. 
History: L. 1909, ch. 109, § 2; 1913, ch. 49, section designations and made related stylistic 
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 3002; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, changes and, in Subsection (l)(a), added the 
40-3-7; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 5; language at the end of the subsection begin-
1985, ch. 33, § 1; 1992, ch. 98, § 2. ning with "if both the parties who have a child 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amend-
 o r children." 
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added the sub-
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful* 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Van Der Stappen v. Van Der 
Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
30-3-10, Custody of children in case of separat ion or di-
vorce — Custody consideration, 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. 
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the chil-
dren's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does net desire custody of the child, or 
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall 
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30-3-10 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
take tha t evidence into consideration 
tody to the other parent 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, * 1; C.L. 1907, 
^ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. 
122, *? 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Award proper 
Change of custody 
— Burden of proof 
Children's choice 
Custody evaluation reports 
Factors in determining best interests of child 
— Moral character 
— Sexual abuse 
Findings required 
Inadequate findings 
Jurisdiction 
Modification 
Pnmarv caretaker 
Cited 
Award proper. 
Award of custody of three children, ages 14, 
8, and 6, to the father was affirmed, where both 
parents were found to be well qualified for cus-
tody but the oldest child wished to live with 
the father and the younger children wished to 
remain with their older sibling Moon v Moon, 
790 P 2 d 52 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
Change of custody. 
In change-of-custody cases involving a 
nonhtigated custodv decree, a trial court, in 
applving the changed-circumstances test, 
should receive evidence on changed circum-
stances and that evidence may include evi-
dence that pertains to the best interests of the 
child In ruling, the trial court should give sta-
bility and continuity the weight that is appro-
priate in light of the duration of the existing 
custodial relationship and the general welfare 
of the child The findings of fact should show 
that the court considered stability as a factor 
in the custody decision and indicate the weight 
the court gave it Elmer v Elmer, 776 P 2d 599 
(Utah 1989) 
Courts should exercise caution in disturbing 
custody awards during the early reconstructive 
months after a divorce It is ordinarily best to 
let the dust settle for a time, lest temporary 
factors incident to readjustment be mistaken 
for material changes Thorpe v Jensen, 817 
P 2 d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
Circumstances of the noncustodial parent or-
dinarily do not bear upon the issue of whether 
a change of custody is appropriate Such fac-
in determining whether to award 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection 
(3) 
tors, aside from exceptional circumstances, are 
not relevant to the court's inquiry Thorpe v 
Jensen, 817 P 2d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
The fact that the mother had been generous 
in sharing physical custody with the father 
was not a ground to change physical custody, if 
anything, it supported leaving primary physi-
cal custody with the mother, as it showed that 
she had lived up to the responsibilities of a 
custodial parent Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d 
836 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
The fact that the children have started 
school does not indicate a substantial change 
in circumstances because only changes not con-
templated by the parties at the time of divorce 
are relevant to the substantial change test 
Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d 836 (Utah Ct App 
1991) 
—Burden of proof. 
The burden of proof lies with the party seek 
ing the change of custody That party must 
first show that there hat> been a change in cir-
cumstances upon which the original custody 
award was based that materially affects the 
custodial parent's parenting abihH or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship and 
that justifies reopening the custody question If 
a substantial change of circumstances can be 
shown, the party must then show that the re 
quested change is in the best interest of the 
children Thorpe v Jensen, 817 P 2d 387 (Utah 
Ct App 1991) 
Children's choice. 
During the course of trial on a noncustodial 
parent's petition for modification of a divorce 
decree, seeking permanent custody of the chil-
dren, it was inappropriate for the court to place 
as much reliance as it did on an eleven-year-
old boy's statement (made to the judge alone in 
chambers without counsel present) that he pre-
ferred to live with his father, the petitioner 
Cummings v Cummings, 175 Utah Adv Rep 
23 (Ct App 1991) 
Custody evaluation reports. 
Rule 4-903(2), Utah Code of Judicial Admin-
istration, permits an evaluator to submit a 
written report to the court, thereb> contem-
plating the use of such a report by a trial court 
in child custody determinations Linam v 
King, 804 P 2 d 1235 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
ind to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
nterlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
udges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
eview and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
riginal appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
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(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent 's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of tha t parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS support amount without finding that a mate-
»* 1-z- x- r J r i a l change of circumstances had occurred 
Modification of award.
 s i n c e ^ p r e v i o u s o r d e r h a d b e e n e n t e r e d . U t e d
* Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
Modification of award. 1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990 
When the parties had agreed to the amount amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
of child support before the effective date of the existing support orders), 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
modify had been filed and in modifying the (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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